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PROTECTING ENDANGERED SPECIES 
HABITAT ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
BALANCE NEED NOT BE A ZERO-SUM 
GAME 
MARISA P. KALEY* 
Abstract: In 2006, the thirty-six acre parcel of land in Hampden, Massachusetts 
on which William and Marlene Pepin planned to build their retirement home was 
designated as “priority habitat” for the eastern box turtle, a species of special 
concern in the Commonwealth. The designation triggered development re-
strictions intended to prevent harm to the turtle, prompting the Pepins to chal-
lenge both the validity of the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act regulations 
that implement the priority habitat scheme, and the decision by the Department 
of Fisheries and Wildlife to so delineate their property. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court upheld the priority habitat scheme and its application to the 
Pepins’ property. Although the outcome was a victory for the environment, this 
Comment argues that the court should have broadened its explanation in order to 
prevent confusion among Massachusetts landowners regarding what avenues for 
defending their private property rights remain available. 
INTRODUCTION 
The town of Hampden, Massachusetts traces its origins back to 1741.1 Lo-
cated about eighty miles southwest of Boston, the town boasts wetlands that make 
it a suitable habitat for the Terrapene carolina, or the eastern box turtle (the “tur-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–2015. 
 1 History of Hampden, MA, HAMPDEN MASS., http://www.hampden.org/history.html (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/R3VU-BKEG. In 1741, the first European settlers followed 
the Nipmuck Indians to a site along the banks of the Scantic River. Id. 
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tle”).2 The turtle is so named because of a hinge on its lower shell that allows it to 
withdraw its head, legs, and tail completely into its shell.3 
The turtles can be found all along the eastern seaboard of the United 
States, from northern Florida to southern Maine, and their range extends west 
into Michigan, Illinois, and Tennessee.4 Within Massachusetts, the turtles face 
a multitude of threats stemming from development, forestry and agricultural 
practices, roadways, illegal collection, all-terrain vehicle use, increased preda-
tion, and climate change.5 Although individual turtles may live for over 100 
years, females do not reach sexual maturity until age fourteen and typically lay 
only a half dozen eggs each year.6 Because even small increases in the mortali-
ty rate can have a destabilizing effect on an already sparse population, the spe-
cies is especially vulnerable to destruction.7 In an effort to address this vulner-
ability, the Division of Fisheries and Wildlife (“DFW”), pursuant to the Mas-
sachusetts Endangered Species Act (“MESA”), has listed the turtles as a spe-
cies of special concern.8 
The turtles, however, were not the only ones drawn to Hampden, Massa-
chusetts.9 William and Marlene Pepin purchased approximately thirty-six acres 
of land in Hampden with the intention of building a single-family home.10 
Much to their chagrin, however, in 2006 their land was designated “priority 
habitat” for the turtles, meaning they faced certain limitations on building, and 
were required to submit a development proposal to the DFW.11 Unhappy with 
the conditions the DFW proposed to attach to their building permit, the Pepins 
filed suit in Massachusetts Superior Court, challenging both the validity of the 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See LORI ERB, MASS. DIV. OF FISHERIES & WILDLIFE, EASTERN BOX TURTLE CONSERVATION 
PLAN FOR MASSACHUSETTS 9 (2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dfg/nhesp/species-
and-conservation/complete-teca-plan.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WH4E-FWD8; NATURAL HER-
ITAGE & ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM, MASS. DIV. OF FISHERIES & WILDLIFE, EASTERN BOX 
TURTLE (TERRAPENE CAROLINA) (2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dfg/nhesp/
species-and-conservation/nhfacts/terrapene-carolina.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WMN3-WG8A; 
The Town of Hampden, MA, HAMPDEN MASS., http://www.hampden.org/town.html (last visited Jan. 
10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/W2AD-QN4F. 
 3 NATURAL HERITAGE & ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM, supra note 2. 
 4 Id. 
 5 ERB, supra note 2, at 27–28, 31–33, 35. 
 6 Id. at 26. 
 7 Id. at 8. 
 8 See 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.90(1)–(2) (2008); 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.90(4) (2012). The 
eastern box turtle is listed as a “species of special concern,” defined in MESA as “any species of plant 
or animal which has been documented by biological research and inventory to have suffered a decline 
that could threaten the species if allowed to continue unchecked or that occurs in such small numbers 
or with such a restricted distribution or specialized habitat requirements that it could easily become 
threatened within the commonwealth.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 1 (2012). 
 9 ERB, supra note 2, at 9. 
 10 Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife, 4 N.E.3d 875, 878 (Mass. 2014). 
 11 See id. 
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priority habitat scheme and the DFW’s review of its decision to designate the 
Pepins’ property as priority habitat.12 
In 2014, in Pepin v. Division of Fisheries and Wildlife, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) upheld the validity of both the priority habitat 
scheme and the DFW’s actions.13 This Comment argues that Pepin was rightly 
decided and that the outcome is consistent with the statutory purpose of MESA 
and its regulations.14 It further argues that the decision reinforced the rights of 
priority habitat landowners.15 To correct the misconception that owners of land 
designated as priority habitat are without robust protection of their private prop-
erty rights, however, this Comment suggests that the SJC should have gone fur-
ther in its explanation of why the absence of explicit landowner protections in 
the MESA regulations did not invalidate the priority habitat scheme.16 The SJC 
should have clarified that despite the absence of explicit protections, both the 
Massachusetts Constitution and the U.S. Constitution protect landowners from 
an invalid uncompensated regulatory taking.17 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Pepins began the process of purchasing their thirty-six acre parcel of 
land in 2006, just months before it was designated priority habitat for the east-
ern box turtle.18 They intended to build a retirement home, but the DFW’s im-
plementation of the MESA regulations complicated their plans.19 In October 
2006, the DFW designated an area of land in Hampden, Massachusetts—
including the Pepins’ parcel—as priority habitat for the turtle, on the basis of a 
1991 sighting of a female turtle of reproductive age in the area.20 
Although the priority habitat designation did not trigger a ban on all de-
velopment of their property, it required the Pepins to secure DFW approval of 
their plans before construction could begin.21 The Pepins submitted their pro-
posal to the DFW in January 2007, and the DFW determined that the project 
had the potential to result in a “take” of a State-listed species, meaning that the 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See id. 
 13 See id. at 887, 889. 
 14 See id. at 885–86; infra notes 36–51 and accompanying text (establishing the statutory purpose 
of MESA and its regulations). 
 15 See infra notes 101–106 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 80, 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 81–100 and accompanying text. 
 18 Conor Berry, Bill Pepin’s Quest to Build Retirement Home in Hampden Derailed by Alleged 
Turtle Spotting Near His Land, MASS LIVE (July 30, 2012, 5:11 PM), http://blog.masslive.com/
breakingnews/print.html?entry=/2012/07/bill_pepin_quest_to_build_retirement_home_in_hampden_
eastern_box_turtle.html, archived at https://perma.cc/XTW4-BZHP?type=image. The Pepins did not 
take possession of the land until 2008. Id. 
 19 See Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife, 4 N.E.3d 875, 878 (Mass. 2014). 
 20 See id. 
 21 See id. 
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construction might harm the turtles or disrupt their habitat.22 The Pepins then 
submitted a revised building plan, whereby the DFW concluded that the pro-
ject could proceed as long as the Pepins agreed to record a deed restriction and 
a conservation easement prior to beginning construction.23 
Instead of accepting the DFW’s conditional approval, the Pepins sought 
DFW review of their property’s designation in September 2008.24 The DFW 
sent a turtle conservation biologist and a regulatory review manager to the 
Pepins’ property to perform a habitat evaluation.25 The results indicated that 
the Pepins’ planned construction site was an “ideal habitat” for the turtles, and 
thus, the DFW upheld the priority habitat designation.26 
In response, in November of 2008, the Pepins requested a hearing before 
a magistrate judge pursuant to the MESA regulations.27 They were granted an 
informal hearing.28 At the hearing, they challenged the DFW’s ability to delin-
eate priority habitats using a method that did not “afford landowners the same 
procedural protections due under MESA to those owning property within sig-
nificant habitats.”29 They also contended that the DFW did not follow the pre-
scribed method for re-examining its original decision to designate their land as 
priority habitat.30 Because the Pepins’ claim was “a direct challenge to the va-
lidity of the regulation, the magistrate granted the DFW’s motion to dismiss 
without prejudice to the Pepins’ right to seek judicial review in the Superior 
Court.”31 
On September 1, 2009, the Pepins filed their claim for declaratory relief 
regarding the validity of the priority habitat regulations in the Massachusetts 
Superior Court, while also seeking review of the magistrate’s decision address-
ing the alleged procedural failure by the DFW.32 The court denied the Pepins’ 
motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted summary judgment in favor 
of the DFW on the Pepins’ challenge to the validity of the priority habitat regu-
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id.; see supra note 8 and accompanying text (defining a species of special concern in MESA). 
 23 Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 878. The DFW reportedly requested that the Pepins set aside seven acres in 
the corner of their parcel that would not be developed, with the expectation that future development of 
the remaining property would require additional permits. Maureen Turner, Fighting for Habitat, VAL-
LEY ADVOC. (Nov. 26, 2009), http://www.valleyadvocate.com/article.cfm?aid=10912, archived at 
http://perma.cc/PRJ8-MQU5. 
 24 Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 878; see infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 25 Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 878. 
 26 Id. 
27 Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife, No. HDCV2009-00838, 2011 WL 12555413, at *1, *4 
(Mass. Supp. 2011); see 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.25(1) (2010). 
 28 Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 879; see 801 MASS. CODE REGS. 1.02(7)(c) (1998). 
 29 Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 879; see infra notes 38–51 and accompanying text (illustrating the differ-
ence between significant habitat designation and priority habitat designation). 
30 Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 879. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Pepin, 2011 WL 12555413, at *4. 
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lations.33 The court reasoned that the regulations were consistent with the pur-
pose of MESA and did not exceed the scope of the DFW’s authority as granted 
to it by MESA.34 The Pepins appealed the decision to the Massachusetts Ap-
peals Court, at which time the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case di-
rectly on its own initiative.35 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Enacted in 1990, the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act (“MESA”) 
aims to “protect rare species and their habitats by prohibiting the ‘Take’ of any 
plant or animal species listed as [e]ndangered, [t]hreatened or of [s]pecial 
[c]oncern by the Division of Fisheries & Wildlife” (“DFW”).36 MESA author-
izes the director of the DFW (the “director”), in consultation with a committee 
and after a public hearing, to compile a list of endangered, threatened, and of 
special concern species.37 These species and their habitats are protected 
through two types of habitat designations: significant and priority.38 
Significant habitat designation is intended for areas “where in the Divi-
sion’s opinion a [p]roject or [a]ctivity would result in the [t]ake of any endan-
gered or threatened species.”39 Significant habitat designations are to be made 
“on the basis of the best scientific evidence available” after considering the 
threats to the population and its habitat, population size, the potential benefits 
of designation to the welfare of the species, and alternative uses of the land.40 
Owners of significant habitat who wish to develop their land must obtain 
a written permit issued by the director.41 Aggrieved landowners may appeal 
significant habitat designation or denial of a permit to alter significant habitat 
to the Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, petition the 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. 
 35 Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 879. Under certain circumstances, such as when the appeal presents a ques-
tion of first impression, a novel question of law, a question related to the U.S. or Massachusetts Con-
stitutions, or a question of public interest, a party may request that a case bypass the Appeals Court 
and appeal directly to the SJC. MASS. R. APP. P. 11(a). Justices on the SJC may also vote for direct 
appellate review of a case when they believe it to be in the public’s interest. Id. at 11(f). 
 36 MA Endangered Species Act (MESA) Overview, MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. 
AFFAIRS, http://www.mass.gov/eea/agencies/dfg/dfw/natural-heritage/regulatory-review/mass-endangered-
species-act-mesa/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/R5TC-PMQT. A “[t]ake” is 
defined as, “in reference to animals to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, hound, kill, trap, capture, collect, 
process, disrupt the nesting, breeding, feeding or migratory activity or attempt to engage in any such 
conduct, or to assist such conduct.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 1 (2012). “Disruption of nesting, 
breeding, feeding or migratory activity may result from, but is not limited to, the modification, degrada-
tion or destruction of [h]abitat.” MA Endangered Species Act (MESA) Overview, supra. 
 37 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 4. This list must be reviewed every five years. Id. 
 38 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.01(2) (2010). 
 39 Id. 
 40 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 4. 
 41 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.66 (2005). 
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director of the DFW to consider purchasing the land, or sue the state for “an 
unconstitutional taking without compensation.”42 
Priority habitat designation, on the other hand, is intended for areas 
“where there is the potential that a [t]ake of any [e]ndangered, [t]hreatened, or 
[s]pecial [c]oncern species may occur as a result of any [p]roject or 
[a]ctivity.”43 The text of MESA does not mention the priority habitat scheme at 
all, but it does instruct the DFW to “adopt any regulations necessary to imple-
ment the provisions of this chapter.”44 The DFW in turn promulgated regula-
tions to implement the MESA prohibition on “takes” of species of special con-
cern through priority habitats.45 Besides expanding the application of a pro-
tected habitat designation to include all three categories of species—
endangered, threatened, and of special concern—the priority habitat designa-
tion allows the DFW to preemptively screen projects and provide guidance to 
landowners seeking to avoid improper takes.46 
Owners of priority habitat may request reconsideration of the designation 
by the DFW and may appeal a final agency decision by requesting an adjudica-
tory hearing before the DFW.47 Whereas the MESA regulations specifically 
provide that owners of significant habitat may petition the director to consider 
purchasing their land or sue based on an invalid uncompensated regulatory 
taking, owners of priority habitat are not explicitly invited to do the same.48 
Owners of priority habitat who wish to develop their land must submit to 
a review by the DFW to determine whether the project can proceed as pro-
posed, proceed pursuant to certain conditions, or cannot proceed because it 
will result in an impermissible take of a State-listed species or habitat.49 “If the 
Division has made a determination of a [t]ake,” the landowner may consult the 
agency to find a way to avoid it or may apply for a permit to proceed despite 
the take.50 An owner who is denied a permit has a right to an adjudicatory 
hearing.51 
Legislation like MESA that restricts the freedom of private property own-
ers to do with their land as they please has been challenged as undue govern-
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id. 10.38–.39; 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.71–.72 (2008). 
 43 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.01(2) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 44 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 4 (2012); Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife, 4 N.E.3d 
875, 882 (Mass. 2014). 
 45 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, §§ 2, 4; 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.01(2) (2010). 
 46 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.01(2). 
 47 Id. at 10.12(8), 10.25(1). 
 48 See id. at 10.25; 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.72 (2008); 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.39 (2005). 
 49 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.18(1), (2)(a)–(b) (2010). 
 50 Id. at 10.18(3). The DFW may decide to issue a permit provided the landowner agrees to take 
action in the form of a combination of onsite and offsite mitigation and financial contribution that 
“provides a long-term Net Benefit” to conservation of the species in question, despite the take. Id. at 
10.23(2), 10.23(6)(b)(2). 
 51 Id. at 10.25(1). 
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ment interference.52 Both the Massachusetts Constitution and the U.S. Consti-
tution include provisions aimed at balancing respect for private property rights 
with the notion that government may intrude upon those rights for the benefit 
of the public.53 The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “pri-
vate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.”54 
The language in Article X of the Massachusetts Constitution closely mirrors 
that of the U.S. Constitution and reads, “[w]henever the public exigencies re-
quire that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, 
he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.”55 The Massachusetts 
Constitution is the supreme law within the Commonwealth’s borders—subject 
only to the U.S. Constitution—and it limits the power of the state legislature 
and various departments within the state government.56 The Fifth Amendment 
applies equally to the state and federal governments, such that even if the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution did not include its own mirror provision, the U.S. Con-
stitution would still protect the property rights of the citizens of the Common-
wealth.57 
An owner of private property who believes government regulation has in-
truded too far on his property rights may challenge the government action as an 
invalid regulatory taking.58 In 1978, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City 
of New York, the Supreme Court articulated a multi-pronged test for determining 
whether government action has resulted in a regulatory taking.59 A court is to 
consider three factors: the economic impact of the regulation, any interference 
with the property owner’s investment-backed expectations, and the character of 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107, 138 (1978) (holding New 
York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law restricting the development Grand Central Terminal did not 
affect an invalid regulatory taking); Blair v. Mass. Dep’t of Conservation & Recreation, 932 N.E.2d 
267, 269–70 (Mass. 2010) (affirming the Department of Conservation and Recreation’s denial of a 
variance under the Watershed Management Act—intended to protect the public water supply—to 
owners of lakefront property in Massachusetts, did not constitute a regulatory taking). 
 53 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X. 
 54 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 55 MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X. 
 56 See David Fellman, Constitutional Law, in 3 GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 197 (1983). 
 57 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 16.1(a) (2014). The Fourteenth Amendment extended the Fifth 
Amendment to apply to states such that “the rules that govern when a government may take property 
for public use and when it must pay just compensation to private individuals when exercising its regu-
latory or eminent domain powers are identical under the two clauses.” Id. § 14.2(a); see also Chicago, 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (confirming the Four-
teenth Amendment extends the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the states). 
 58 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978); Penn. Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412, 414 (1922) (finding a Pennsylvania law prohibiting mining for coal in a 
manner that would damage a house on the land’s surface as an invalid government taking of its con-
tract and property rights). 
 59 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
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the governmental action.60 A court must regard the parcel as a whole rather than 
just the impacted portion, and if the owner is still able to “obtain a reasonable 
return” from his property, even when it is subject to the regulation, then there is 
no taking.61 The Supreme Court summarized the underlying rationale for this 
limit on private property rights, saying “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to 
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying 
for every such change in the general law.”62 
In 2010, in Blair v. Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Rec-
reation, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that unless gov-
ernment regulation of private property rises to the level of a taking, the proper-
ty owner is not entitled to compensation.63 At issue in Blair was the Watershed 
Management Act (“WMA”), which prevented a Massachusetts couple from 
making certain changes to their lakefront property.64 The Massachusetts De-
partment of Conservation and Recreation denied the Blairs’ request for a vari-
ance under the WMA, prompting them to claim the effect of the law resulted in 
an uncompensated regulatory taking of their land in violation of both the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution and the Fifth Amendment.65 The SJC disagreed and, 
applying the Penn Central analysis, concluded that there was no regulatory 
taking and thus no requirement that the Commonwealth compensate the Blairs 
for the effect the WMA had on their property.66 
III. ANALYSIS 
In 2014, in Pepin v. Division of Fisheries and Wildlife, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) upheld both the validity of the Massachusetts 
Endangered Species Act (“MESA”) priority habitat scheme as implemented by 
the Division of Fisheries and Wildlife (“DFW”), as well as the procedure the 
DFW used in reviewing its application of the designation to William and Mar-
                                                                                                                           
 60 See id. With respect to the “character” of the governmental action, the Court distinguished 
between a physical invasion and a regulatory interference, stating that the former is more likely to lead 
to a finding that there has been a taking. Id. 
 61 See id. at 130–31, 136–38. The Court held that New York’s historical preservation laws did not 
“interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central’s primary expectation concerning use of the 
parcel,” namely the continued operation of Grand Central Terminal, and thus permitted Penn Central 
to “obtain a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment.” Id. at 136. 
 62 Penn. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413. This statement by Justice Holmes appears frequently in sub-
sequent opinions on the topic of government takings, including Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, and 
Blair v. Mass. Dep’t of Conservation & Recreation, 932 N.E.2d 267, 275 (Mass. 2010). 
 63 See 932 N.E.2d at 269–70. 
 64 See id. at 269. One purpose of the Division of Water Supply Protection, created by the WMA, 
was to “utilize and conserve said water and other natural resources in order to protect, preserve and 
enhance the environment of the commonwealth and to assure the availability of pure water for future 
generations.” See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 92A1/2, § 2 (2003). 
 65 See Blair, 932 N.E.2d at 269, 271, 273. 
 66 Id. at 276–77. 
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lene Pepins’ property in Hampden, Massachusetts.67 The SJC upheld the 
scheme as a whole by rejecting the Pepins’ contention that “procedural mecha-
nisms” similar to those incorporated into the significant habitat scheme should 
also apply to priority habitat.68 The court acknowledged that the regulations do 
not extend comparable protections to owners of priority habitat, but concluded 
that this variation was appropriate given the degree to which each designation 
restricts private property rights.69 It reasoned that, because the development 
restrictions on priority habitat are not intended to be as severe as those im-
posed on significant habitat, the protections need not be correspondingly ro-
bust.70 The SJC correctly interpreted MESA in light of its statutory purpose, 
but it could have gone further in explaining the operation of the state and fed-
eral constitutional backstop that continues to protect owners of priority habi-
tat.71 Doing so would have prevented confusion among such landowners re-
garding their right to challenge the development restrictions that accompany 
priority habitat designation.72 
The court was correct in finding that the priority habitat regulations need 
not be as protective of private property owners as the significant habitat regu-
lations because they are consistent with the purpose of MESA and do not trig-
ger the comparably more severe development restrictions that accompany sig-
nificant habitat designation.73 As the court pointed out, the purpose of MESA 
is to “prevent the decline of at-risk species by protecting species themselves, as 
well as the habitats in which they live, from undue human encroachment.”74 
Although it addresses a method by which the Commonwealth may protect hab-
itat belonging to endangered and threatened species, MESA gives no explicit 
indication of how the habitat of species of special concern should be protect-
ed.75 The DFW conceived of priority habitat regulations that are designed to 
enable the agency to review individual development projects and provide tai-
                                                                                                                           
 67 4 N.E.3d 875, 887, 889 (Mass. 2014). In upholding the magistrate’s decision to grant the 
DFW’s motion for a directed decision, the court determined that the priority habitat scheme was 
properly applied to the Pepins’ property. See id. at 887–89. Even though the Pepins did not have the 
opportunity to challenge the testimony of the DFW’s witnesses because an informal hearing never 
took place, the court noted that the regulations governing such hearings permit the presiding officer to 
decide dispositive motions without a hearing. Id. at 887–88. The court held that “this type of proce-
dure does not contravene the requirements of either the Administrative Procedure Act or due process.” 
Id. at 888. 
 68 Id. at 887. 
 69 See id. at 886–87. 
 70 See id. 
 71 See infra notes 79–100 and accompanying text. 
 72 See infra notes 79–100 and accompanying text. 
 73 See Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 886–87. 
 74 Id. at 880. 
 75 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 4 (2012); see also Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 882 (“In promulgat-
ing regulations to implement the take provision, the division has established a second type of habitat 
designation, that of ‘priority habitat,’ for which MESA makes no express provision.”). 
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lored guidance to landowners regarding how to prevent a violation of MESA 
with respect to species of special concern.76 Thus, the statute and regulations 
implicitly allow the Commonwealth to impede development of private proper-
ty.77 The court correctly concluded that in the Pepins’ case, the regulations did 
what they were intended to do, and it is not necessary to add more landowner 
protections given that restrictions on development resulting from priority habi-
tat designation will be minimal.78 
Although the SJC correctly determined that owners of priority habitat-
designated land retain adequate procedural protections under the MESA regu-
lations, the scope of its explanation was too narrow to prevent continuing con-
fusion about what that protection includes.79 In response to Pepin, landowners 
have decried the priority habitat designation as stripping them of the ability to 
protect their private property rights.80 Contrary to this perception, however, the 
protections available to owners of priority habitat-designated land are not lim-
ited to what is set forth in the MESA regulations.81 The Pepins argued that 
whereas the statute and regulations each provide four specific protections to 
owners of significant habitat—ranging from advance written notice to the right 
to seek compensation for a government taking—the regulations do not afford 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 882; 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.01(2) (2010). 
 77 See Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 882, 886–87; MASS. CODE REGS. 10.01(2). 
 78 See Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 882, 886–87. Indeed, the DFW did not seek to bar all development on 
the Pepins’ parcel. See id. at 878. 
 79 See id. at 887; infra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 80 See Pepin v. Division of Fisheries and Wildlife, NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS, 
http://www.nahb.org/generic.aspx?genericContentID=217232 (last visited Jan. 10, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/W2WA-4VFB (“One of the primary differences [between the significant and priority 
habitat programs] is that when the development of private land is restricted by the Division, the legisla-
ture’s program permits the landowner to apply to the Superior Court for damages for the taking of private 
land for a public purpose . . . while the Division’s regulatory program does not allow the same.”); Seth 
Jaffe, In Massachusetts, Regulatory Agencies Are Still (Almost) Always Right, LAW & ENV’T, FOLEY 
HOAG (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.lawandenvironment.com/2014/02/18/in-massachusetts-regulatory-
agencies-are-still-almost-always-right/, archived at http://perma.cc/UW64-S3D7 (“After the decision by 
the Supreme Judicial Court yesterday in Pepin v. Division of Fisheries and Wildlife . . . one could almost 
say that MESA is a blank slate, authorizing DFW to write any regulations it chooses that might arguably 
benefit species that are endangered, threatened, or of ‘special concern.’”); Michael Seward, Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court Decision Imperils Private Property Rights; MESA a Good Law with Bad 
Implementation, SAWICKI REAL ESTATE (Jun. 26, 2014, 7:28 PM), http://www.westernmassproperties.
com/pioneer-valley-real-estate-news/massachusetts-supreme-judicial-court-decision-imperils-private-
property-rights-mesa-a-good-law-with-bad-implementation/, archived at http://perma.cc/W25W-JJYG 
(“Although MESA acknowledges property rights with its significant habitat designation . . . this is not the 
case with the MassWildlife’s priority habitat designation. There is no judicial recourse or compensation 
for a property owner if their property has been designation [sic] as such.”). 
 81 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“Private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”); MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X (“Whenever the public exigencies require that the proper-
ty of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation 
therefor.”); NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS, supra note 80; Jaffe, supra note 80; Seward, supra note 
80. 
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any of these protections to owners of priority habitat.82 The absence of explic-
itly enumerated statutory rights, however, does not mean that owners of priori-
ty habitat-designated land are left unprotected from undue government inter-
ference.83 
If the Pepins felt that the conditions attached to their permit would consti-
tute an invalid uncompensated regulatory taking, nothing in the priority habitat 
regulations would have prevented them from defending their state or federal 
constitutional rights by filing a takings suit.84 The absence of a provision in the 
priority habitat regulations inviting aggrieved landowners to seek compensa-
tion for a government taking does not bar their ability to do so.85 Although the 
Pepins desired explicit regulatory permission to seek compensation, given the 
constitutional protection already afforded to them at both the state and federal 
levels, such an invitation was not necessary to safeguard their right to pursue a 
takings claim.86 
The SJC should have clarified that one’s right to challenge a regulatory 
taking emanates not from any statute but from the Massachusetts Constitution 
and the U.S. Constitution.87 Both Constitutions provide that owners of private 
property diverted to public use are entitled to reasonable compensation.88 
Thus, the court should have clearly explained that this right, granted by both 
Constitutions, is ever present because both documents implicitly supplement 
                                                                                                                           
 82 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 27–29, Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife, 4 N.E.3d 875 
(Mass. 2014) (No. 2012-11332), 2012 WL 8684862, at *27–29. 
 83 See supra notes 53–66 and accompanying text. As discussed above, constitutional protections 
against invalid government takings are always available regardless of the language in a statute or 
regulation. See supra notes 53–66 and accompanying text. 
 84 See 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.12(8), 10.25 (2010) (containing no prohibition on bringing a 
takings challenge); see also Blair v. Mass. Dep’t of Conservation & Recreation, 932 N.E.2d 267, 269, 
274 (Mass. 2010) (recognizing a Massachusetts couple’s constitutional takings challenge apart from 
any statutory right to bring such a claim). 
 85 See Blair, 932 N.E.2d at 269, 274; 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.12(8), 10.25. 
 86 See Blair, 932 N.E.2d at 269, 274; 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.12(8), 10.25 (containing no pro-
hibition on bringing a takings challenge); Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 82, at 27–28, 46. 
The procedure for obtaining relief from the DFW’s improper habitat designation may differ, but the 
compensatory remedy is ultimately the same. See 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.39 (2005); 321 MASS. 
CODE REGS. 10.72 (2008); supra note 84. The significant habitat regulations provide for both petition-
ing the director of the DFW to consider purchasing the land and suing the state for “an unconstitutional 
taking without compensation.” 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.39; 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.72. Both the 
Massachusetts Constitution and the U.S. Constitution allow for compensation as a remedy for success-
ful claims of an invalid government taking. See Blair, 932 N.E.2d at 269, 277. 
 87 See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text; see also Blair, 932 N.E.2d at 267 (affirming the 
protection afforded to private property rights by both the Massachusetts Constitution and the U.S. 
Constitution in the context of an alleged invalid taking resulting from the operation of state law). 
 88 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X. Specifically, the U.S. Constitution 
states, “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. The Massachusetts Constitution includes a similar provision, which states, “[w]henever the 
public exigencies require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he 
shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.” MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X. 
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the text of all statutes and regulations.89 Because owners of priority habitat-
designated land are already constitutionally protected from uncompensated 
regulatory takings, any equivalent protection provided in the priority habitat 
regulations would be redundant and a potential source of confusion.90 
Without judicial clarification as a guide, landowners like the Pepins have 
misinterpreted the priority habitat designation in a way that would essentially 
require redundancy in all statutes and regulations.91 The Pepins accused the 
DFW of implementing a conservation strategy that relies exclusively on the 
priority habitat designation as a way to avoid compliance with the landowner 
protections explicitly afforded by significant habitat designation—namely the 
ability to petition the director to purchase the land or file suit for an invalid 
regulatory taking.92 They perceived the DFW’s failure to include certain lan-
guage in the priority habitat regulations as the Commonwealth’s attempt to 
avoid paying compensation by eliminating their ability to seek that remedy.93 
In effect, the Pepins sought to impute a new requirement that a state regulatory 
agency must include language in its regulations that explicitly invites ag-
grieved citizens to exercise and vindicate their constitutional rights.94 Never-
theless, because the state and federal constitutional provisions that grant indi-
vidual rights—including the right to due process with respect to deprivation of 
                                                                                                                           
 89 See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
 90 See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. A subdivision of a state, including an adminis-
trative agency like the DFW, “represents government or state authority to a sufficient degree to invoke 
constitutional restrictions on its actions.” See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 57 § 16.1(a). 
 91 See NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS, supra note 80; Jaffe, supra note 80; Seward, supra note 
80. 
 92 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 82, at 34–35, 41–42. The Pepins argued:  
The four protections which the Legislature mandated in favor of the landowner under 
the terms of the Act should not be avoided by the Division by merely creating a second 
class of land designation with ever so slight, cosmetic differences in the wording of the 
burden placed upon the landowner and then naming these areas “priority habitats,” ra-
ther than “significant habitats” . . . . It is apparent that the priority habitat regulations rep-
resent the Division’s attempt to restrict the development of land for the benefit of protect-
ed species of plants and animals without having to comply with the statutory requirement 
that the Division grant to landowners the protections and rights guaranteed under the terms 
of the Act. 
Id. At the time this case was decided, no land in Massachusetts had yet been designated as significant 
habitat, but nearly four hundred thousand acres in the western part of the state were designated priori-
ty habitat. Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife, 4 N.E.3d 875, n.7 (Mass. 2014). 
 93 See Berry, supra note 18. In July 2011 William Pepin testified before the Joint Committee on 
Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture that government officials “know that money would 
be hard to come by, so they’ve invented a way to command the use of the land for free.” Id. Mr. Pepin 
told MassLive.com that he had spent at least half a million dollars, including the purchase price of the 
land and legal and consulting costs, trying to build his house and said, “[t]hey appropriated the use of 
my land to accomplish their goal. Where’s my compensation?” Id. 
 94 See id. 
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private property rights—already supplement state and federal statutes and reg-
ulations, such a requirement would have no practical effect.95 
By failing to emphasize the constitutional backstop in its opinion, the SJC 
sent the wrong message to the average Massachusetts landowner.96 Lay land-
owners who are presumably unfamiliar with constitutional law could interpret 
this decision to mean that witnessing an animal designated as a species of spe-
cial concern—a designation not as severe as either endangered or threatened—
scurry over their property fifteen years ago could leave them helpless against 
the DFW’s ability to restrict their property rights.97 In reality, however, the ef-
fect of the decision in Pepin is much narrower.98 The court did not foreclose a 
landowner’s option to seek compensation for an invalid uncompensated regu-
latory taking.99 And yet, by confining its explanation to a discussion of MESA, 
with no mention of the Fifth Amendment, the SJC forewent an opportunity to 
clarify to Massachusetts landowners that the difference between the language 
in the regulations associated with significant versus priority habitats has no 
effect on their constitutional rights.100 
The SJC’s decision in Pepin actually appears to be beneficial to Massa-
chusetts landowners’ rights.101 It indicates that the DFW can work with land-
owners, rather than against them, to facilitate development projects that avoid 
MESA violations.102 By upholding the priority habitat regulations, the court 
guaranteed that the DFW has a tool to screen development projects before they 
begin.103 This was crucially important because the priority designation is the 
less restrictive of the two habitat designations available to the DFW, and so far, 
it is the only one that has been applied.104 By relying solely on the priority hab-
                                                                                                                           
 95 See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
 96 See supra notes 84–95 and accompanying text. 
 97 See Berry, supra note 18; NAT’L ASS’N OF HOME BUILDERS, supra note 80; Jaffe, supra note 
80; Seward, supra note 80; supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 98 See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
 99 See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. Both the Massachusetts Constitution and the 
U.S. Constitution ensure that when landowners and the DFW disagree about how “minimal” the gov-
ernment’s intrusion into private property rights is, the landowner retains the right to bring a takings 
challenge. See supra note 84–88 and accompanying text (illustrating why, regardless of the language 
in the regulations, landowners maintain constitutional rights to challenge the state action). 
 100 See Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife, 4 N.E.3d 875, 875–89 (Mass. 2014); supra notes 
84–95 and accompanying text. 
 101 See infra notes 102–106 and accompanying text. 
 102 See Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 882, 887; 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.01(2), 10.12(8), 10.25 (2010). The 
decision enables DFW to do this without eliminating a landowner’s ability to bring a takings chal-
lenge. See Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 882, 887; 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.01(2), 10.12(8), 10.25 (containing 
no prohibition on bringing a takings challenge); see also Blair v. Mass. Dep’t of Conservation & Rec-
reation, 932 N.E.2d 267, 269, 274 (Mass. 2010) (recognizing a Massachusetts couple’s constitutional 
takings challenge apart from any statutory right to bring such a claim). 
 103 See Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 882, 887; 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.01(2). 
 104 See Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 881–82; 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.99. Because the DFW has yet to 
designate any area in MA as significant habitat, there are no test cases, but the language in MESA 
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itat designation, the DFW is more often than not able to guide landowners to a 
compromise that allows building to proceed while also avoiding a take of a 
State-listed species.105 This outcome is consistent with the goal of the priority 
habitat regulations, which the court concluded “are designed to facilitate prop-
erty development, albeit in an environmentally sensitive manner.”106 
CONCLUSION 
In Pepin v. Division of Fisheries and Wildlife, a Massachusetts couple, 
William and Marlene Pepin, refused to make certain concessions to the state in 
order to obtain a permit to build a house on land designated as priority habitat 
for the eastern box turtle under the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act 
(“MESA”). The Pepins challenged the priority habitat scheme based on the 
absence of landowner protections that mirroring those codified in the MESA 
provisions applicable to owners of significant habitat. The Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court (SJC) held that because priority habitat designation does 
not result in the same severe land use restrictions that significant habitat desig-
nation likely would, the priority habitat regulations need not include compara-
ble statutory landowner protections. 
In upholding the priority habitat scheme as a valid method of habitat 
management, this Comment argues that the SJC preserved a valuable tool that 
allows the Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wildlife (“DFW”) to be 
proactive—rather than reactive—in seeking landowner compromise related to 
species conservation and habitat protection. The decision thus achieves the 
statutory goal of conservation on a grand scale, without sacrificing substantial 
private property rights. Nevertheless, some people continue to hold the mistak-
en belief that the absence of explicit safeguards in the MESA priority habitat 
regulations leaves them without any protection against the DFW’s interference. 
This Comment argues that although this belief is misplaced, the SJC missed an 
opportunity to reassure landowners that both the Massachusetts Constitution 
and the U.S. Constitution grant them the right to pursue a claim that priority 
habitat designation has resulted in an invalid uncompensated regulatory taking. 
                                                                                                                           
prohibiting any alteration of significant habitat without a permit creates a presumption that any devel-
opment is forbidden. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 2 (2012); 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.99. In 
contrast, the language in the priority habitat regulations makes it clear that the DFW intends to allow 
development in those areas. See 321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.12(1). 
 105 See EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, MESA DETERMINATIONS FY 08–FY 12 
(2012), available at http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/dfg/nhesp/regulatory-review/reg-rev-outcomes-
fy08-fy12.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/99MK-FMN9. From 2008 through 2012, the DFW deter-
mined that at least 75% of the proposed development projects it reviewed each year under MESA 
could proceed without modification. See id. Another 18% to 22% of the projects each year could be 
conditioned to avoid a take, meaning that over the five year period, 5% or fewer of the proposed pro-
jects were blocked because they would result in a take of a state-listed species. See id. 
106 See Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 886. 
